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  Why	  is	  Noam	  Chomsky	  such	  a	  towering	  figure	  in	  linguistics	  today?	  He	  asked	  a	  very	  simple	  question	  that	  no	  one	  had	  ever	  asked	  before,	  and	  then	  discovered	  that	  the	  answer	  was	  unexpected	  and	  highly	  complicated.	  He	  asked	  what	  capacity	  a	  language	  user	  needed	  to	  have	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  learn	  to	  use	  a	  language	  (any	  language)	  grammatically.	  Questions	  about	  grammar	  had	  of	  course	  been	  asked	  (and	  answered)	  before.	  The	  standard	  grammatical	  rules	  of	  English,	  French,	  Latin,	  Chinese	  or	  any	  other	  well-­‐studied	  language	  are	  known.	  Speakers	  learn	  them	  either	  by	  induction	  	  -­‐-­‐	  imitation	  and	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  experience,	  with	  corrections	  from	  other	  speakers	  -­‐-­‐	  or	  they	  are	  taught	  them,	  through	  formal,	  explicit	  instruction	  (especially	  when	  they	  are	  learning	  a	  second	  language).	  But	  the	  capacity	  to	  learn	  these	  “ordinary	  grammar”	  rules	  was	  not	  what	  Chomsky	  was	  asking	  about:	  He	  was	  asking	  about	  the	  capacity	  to	  learn	  any	  
language	  at	  all.	  This	  is	  a	  capacity	  that	  all	  other	  animals,	  some	  brain-­‐injured	  humans,	  and	  all	  machines	  built	  or	  programmed	  so	  far	  lack.	  This	  uniquely	  human	  capacity	  to	  learn	  language	  also	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  universal,	  yet	  unfamilar:	  universal,	  because	  it	  was	  the	  very	  same	  capacity	  in	  every	  person,	  for	  every	  possible	  language,	  but	  unfamiliar,	  in	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  this	  “universal	  grammar”	  (UG)	  bore	  very	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  ordinary	  grammar	  that	  were	  already	  known.	  The	  way	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  were	  gradually	  discovered	  was	  by	  trying	  out	  guesses	  as	  to	  what	  might	  be	  a	  rule	  of	  UG,	  and	  then	  testing	  the	  candidate	  rule	  to	  see	  whether	  it	  gave	  rise	  to	  grammatical	  or	  ungrammatical	  sentences.	  What	  was	  remarkable	  was	  that	  speakers	  of	  any	  language	  could	  immediately	  say	  whether	  a	  new	  sentence	  was	  or	  was	  not	  grammatical,	  even	  though	  the	  rules	  that	  were	  being	  tested	  were	  not	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  ordinary	  grammars	  that	  they	  had	  been	  taught	  (or	  had	  learned	  by	  induction).	  If	  it	  had	  stopped	  there,	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  would	  have	  been	  an	  important	  and	  original	  contribution	  to	  linguistics,	  and	  the	  only	  surprise	  would	  have	  been	  that	  these	  rules	  had	  existed	  all	  along,	  yet	  no	  one	  had	  noticed	  them,	  because	  we	  were	  all	  following	  them	  unconsciously,	  perhaps	  the	  way	  we	  execute	  athletic	  skills	  without	  knowing	  the	  rules	  our	  bodies	  are	  following.	  Yet	  –	  apart	  from	  some	  basic	  primate	  mechanisms	  of	  movement	  that	  are	  inborn	  as	  a	  result	  of	  our	  evolutionary	  history	  –	  athletic	  skills	  are	  learned,	  whether	  through	  instruction	  or	  through	  induction.	  So	  if	  UG	  is	  not	  learned	  by	  explicit	  instruction,	  is	  it	  learned	  implicitly	  (unconsciously),	  by	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  induction?	  	  The	  answer	  was	  the	  second	  and	  by	  far	  the	  biggest	  surprise:	  The	  rules	  of	  UG	  are	  unlearnable	  by	  trial	  and	  error	  induction,	  based	  on	  what	  the	  language-­‐learning	  child	  says	  and	  hears,	  unless	  
most	  of	  the	  rules	  are	  already	  inborn.	  (What	  the	  child	  can	  learn	  through	  imitation,	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  induction	  and	  error-­‐correction	  from	  adults	  are	  some	  minor	  options	  among	  these	  inborn	  rules,	  because	  these	  options,	  unlike	  UG	  itself,	  vary	  from	  language	  to	  language.)	  The	  impossibility	  of	  learning	  UG	  itself	  by	  induction	  applies	  only	  to	  the	  language-­‐learning	  child’s	  database:	  everything	  the	  child	  hears	  and	  says	  while	  learning	  to	  understand	  and	  speak.	  It	  obviously	  cannot	  be	  impossible	  to	  learn	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  from	  any	  database	  at	  all	  through	  induction,	  otherwise	  Chomsky	  and	  the	  generations	  of	  linguists	  since	  his	  discovery	  could	  not	  have	  learned	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  either.	  But	  linguists	  learn	  UG	  collectively,	  collaboratively	  and	  cumulatively,	  and	  their	  database	  is	  being	  continuously	  updated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  years	  and	  
decades	  of	  this	  trial	  and	  error	  experience,	  based	  on	  testing	  candidate	  UG	  rules	  against	  speakers’	  judgments	  (often	  the	  linguist’s	  own)	  at	  to	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  grammatical.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  language-­‐learning	  child	  only	  hears	  speech	  that	  complies	  with	  UG;	  and,	  surprisingly,	  after	  a	  very	  brief	  initial	  period	  that	  falls	  short	  of	  any	  grammar	  at	  all,	  the	  child	  only	  
produces	  UG-­‐compliant	  speech.	  So	  there	  are	  never	  any	  UG	  errors	  to	  correct.	  (There	  are	  plenty	  of	  errors	  of	  ordinary	  grammar,	  and	  those	  do	  get	  corrected,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  UG	  errors,	  and	  hence	  do	  not	  explain	  how	  the	  child	  manages	  to	  speak	  UG-­‐compliantly,	  hence	  how	  the	  child	  “knows”	  the	  rules	  if	  UG,	  even	  if	  only	  unconsciously.)	  Chomsky	  has	  called	  this	  insufficiency	  of	  the	  language-­‐learning	  child’s	  database	  for	  the	  learning	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  “the	  poverty	  of	  the	  stimulus.”	  He	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  is	  an	  extreme	  form	  of	  underdetermination	  of	  theory	  by	  data.	  All	  nontrivial	  theories	  are	  underdetermined	  by	  data:	  That’s	  why	  it’s	  not	  obvious	  what	  the	  underlying	  rules	  generating	  the	  data	  are.	  In	  natural	  science,	  the	  “rules”	  are	  the	  laws	  of	  nature,	  and	  the	  data	  are	  what	  we	  can	  observe	  by	  observation	  and	  experiment.	  It	  is	  not	  immediately	  obvious	  that,	  say,	  objects	  attract	  one	  another	  with	  a	  force	  that	  is	  proportional	  to	  the	  product	  of	  their	  masses	  and	  inversely	  proportional	  to	  the	  squared	  distance	  between	  them,	  but	  Newton’s	  universal	  law	  of	  gravitation,	  though	  underdetermined,	  was	  discoverable	  via	  induction	  (and	  genius),	  and	  Newton	  did	  indeed	  discover	  it.	  Hence	  the	  underdetermination	  was	  not	  so	  great	  as	  to	  make	  the	  law	  of	  universal	  gravitation	  unlearnable	  from	  the	  data	  available.	  	  But	  to	  see	  how	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  the	  language-­‐learning	  child	  to	  learn	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  from	  the	  data	  available	  to	  the	  child,	  you	  do	  not	  even	  need	  to	  know	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  what	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  are:	  It	  would	  be	  like	  trying	  to	  learn	  a	  (nontrivial)	  category	  based	  on	  “positive	  evidence”	  alone:	  The	  only	  thing	  you	  ever	  encounter	  is	  members	  of	  the	  category:	  never	  a	  non-­member.	  How	  are	  you	  to	  learn	  what	  distinguishes	  the	  members	  from	  the	  non-­‐members?	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  trivial	  case:	  If	  you	  lived	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  every	  object	  you	  encountered	  was	  white,	  and	  you	  had	  to	  call	  them	  all	  “white,”	  and	  then	  you	  saw	  something	  black	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  your	  life,	  you	  would	  perhaps	  hesitate	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  call	  it	  “white.”	  But	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  are	  not	  a	  simple	  black/white	  matter,	  where	  positive	  evidence	  alone	  (plus	  an	  innate	  black/white	  perception	  system)	  might	  be	  enough	  to	  make	  the	  distinction	  -­‐-­‐	  between	  perceiving	  (or	  producing)	  a	  UG-­‐compliant	  utterence	  and	  a	  non-­‐UG-­‐compliant	  utterance	  -­‐-­‐	  obvious.	  Learning	  to	  speak	  UG-­‐compliantly	  is	  more	  like	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  rules	  of	  chess	  from	  viewing	  many	  chess	  games,	  all	  played	  by	  the	  rules	  (no	  errors),	  and	  then,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  that	  sample	  of	  positive	  evidence	  alone,	  becoming	  able	  to	  play	  chess	  rulefully,	  with	  no	  need	  for	  error-­‐correction,	  never	  having	  seen	  or	  made	  an	  error.	  Under	  those	  conditions	  one	  would	  have	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  chess	  had	  been	  inborn.	  Now	  we	  know	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  chess	  are	  not	  inborn:	  they	  are	  learned	  (hence	  learnable)	  via	  observation,	  imitation,	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  induction,	  error	  correction	  and	  instruction.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  have	  plenty	  of	  both	  positive	  evidence	  and	  negative	  evidence	  (errors	  and	  error-­‐corrections)	  from	  which	  to	  induce	  the	  rules	  (and	  even	  explicit	  instruction	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  learning).	  Hence	  no	  poverty	  of	  the	  stimulus	  for	  chess.	  But	  if	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  are	  inborn	  because	  they	  cannot	  be	  learned	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  one-­‐sided	  data	  accessible	  to	  the	  language-­‐learning	  child,	  how	  did	  those	  rules	  get	  into	  our	  brains?	  There	  are	  plenty	  of	  unproblematic	  examples	  of	  biological	  traits	  –	  both	  structures	  and	  functions,	  
including	  behavioral	  capacities	  –	  in	  which	  a	  plausible	  evolutionary	  explanation	  can	  be	  given	  of	  how	  the	  trait	  was	  shaped	  by	  “trial	  and	  error”	  across	  evolutionary	  time.	  This	  is	  the	  usual	  Darwinian	  scenario	  of	  genetic	  variation	  and	  selective	  retention,	  based	  on	  advantages	  (or	  disadvantages)	  for	  survival	  and	  reproduction.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  obvious	  what	  the	  Darwinian	  variation	  and	  advantages	  would	  be	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  UG	  by	  trial	  and	  error.	  Some	  have	  taken	  this	  as	  an	  empirical	  mark	  against	  the	  plausibility	  of	  UG.	  However,	  no	  one	  has	  provided	  any	  evidence	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  are	  learnable	  after	  all	  (i.e.,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  against	  the	  poverty	  of	  the	  stimulus:	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  language-­‐learning	  child	  turns	  out	  to	  have	  sufficient	  negative	  evidence	  after	  all).	  Nor	  has	  anyone	  provided	  an	  alternative	  to	  UG:	  an	  alternative	  that,	  like	  UG,	  provides	  rules	  that	  give	  people	  the	  capacity	  to	  generate	  all	  and	  only	  the	  utterances	  that	  are	  universally	  judged	  to	  be	  grammatical	  and	  to	  distinguish	  those	  from	  the	  ones	  that	  are	  ungrammatical,	  but,	  unlike	  UG,	  is	  either	  learnable	  by	  the	  language-­‐learning	  child	  or	  has	  a	  plausible	  Darwinian	  explanation	  for	  how	  it	  would	  have	  been	  selected	  by	  evolution	  because	  of	  its	  advantages	  for	  survival	  and	  reproduction.	  Chomsky	  has	  often	  described	  himself	  as	  a	  Cartesian:	  a	  proponent	  of	  Descartes’	  theory	  of	  innate	  ideas.	  But	  perhaps	  he	  is	  closer	  to	  being	  a	  Platonist,	  in	  that	  the	  innateness	  and	  universality	  of	  the	  ideas	  is	  not	  a	  result	  of	  evolutionary	  selection	  but	  of	  the	  natural	  laws	  of	  the	  physical	  universe	  and	  perhaps	  even	  the	  universal	  laws	  of	  formal	  logic	  and	  mathematics.	  	  Grammar	  (syntax),	  however,	  is	  not	  “ideas”	  but	  just	  the	  form	  or	  shape	  of	  symbols.	  In	  mathematics,	  the	  rules	  are	  based	  on	  the	  shapes	  of	  the	  symbols	  alone,	  not	  their	  meanings.	  In	  language,	  however,	  the	  symbols	  (words)	  are	  inseparable	  from	  their	  meanings.	  They	  express	  thoughts.	  Chomsky’s	  own	  intuition	  as	  to	  the	  relation	  (“interface”)	  between	  meaning	  and	  syntax	  is	  that	  language	  is	  what	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  us	  (or	  anyone)	  to	  think	  at	  all;	  and	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  thinking	  itself	  comes	  with	  certain	  Platonic	  constraints,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  result	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  UG.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  UG	  is	  bound	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  thought.	  UG-­‐non-­‐compliant	  utterances	  are	  either	  ill-­‐expressed	  thoughts	  or	  unthinkable	  thoughts.	  All	  (and	  only)	  thinkable	  thoughts	  can	  be	  expressed	  UG-­‐compliantly.	  	  Unlike	  the	  theory	  of	  UG	  itself,	  however,	  this	  further	  intuitive	  idea	  about	  constraints	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  thought	  is	  neither	  an	  empirically	  testable	  theory	  nor	  a	  mathematically	  provable	  theorem	  -­‐-­‐	  so	  far.	  	  Chomsky’s	  theory	  of	  UG	  itself,	  if	  it	  is	  true,	  definitely	  poses	  problems	  for	  evolutionary	  biology;	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  these	  are	  problems	  for	  linguistics.	  If	  the	  grammaticality	  judgments	  that	  provide	  the	  data	  for	  hypothesis-­‐testing	  about	  the	  rules	  of	  UG	  are	  reliable	  and	  universal,	  then	  the	  only	  way	  to	  challenge	  UG	  (if	  one	  feels	  there	  are	  grounds	  for	  challenging	  UG)	  is	  to	  construct	  a	  rival	  theory	  –	  a	  theory	  that	  can	  likewise	  provide	  the	  rules	  for	  generating	  all	  and	  only	  what	  is	  universally	  judged	  grammatical	  and	  distinguishing	  it	  from	  what	  is	  not,	  but	  with	  rules	  that	  can,	  after	  all,	  be	  learned	  by	  the	  child,	  or,	  failing	  that,	  can	  plausibly	  have	  been	  evolved	  biologically,	  by	  our	  species.	  	  If	  one	  cannot	  find	  a	  rival	  theory	  that	  does	  the	  job	  but	  whose	  rules	  are	  either	  learnable	  or	  evolvable	  then	  one	  can	  challenge	  the	  data	  supporting	  UG	  by	  showing	  that	  grammaticality	  judgments	  are	  not	  reliable	  or	  universal,	  but	  variable	  and	  malleable.	  If	  so,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  universal	  capacity	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  explained,	  hence	  no	  UG,	  	  nor	  any	  need	  for	  it.	  	  
All	  these	  competing	  strategies	  and	  critiques	  (and	  more)	  to	  show	  Chomsky	  to	  have	  been	  wrong	  have	  been	  attempted,	  many,	  many	  times	  over,	  so	  far	  without	  success.	  It	  is	  a	  separate	  question	  why	  so	  many	  people	  in	  so	  many	  fields	  are	  motivated	  to	  try	  to	  show	  that	  Chomsky	  is	  wrong.	  Perhaps	  it’s	  because	  everyone	  speaks	  language,	  but	  not	  everyone	  speaks	  mathematics,	  so	  we	  are	  ready	  to	  challenge	  linguists	  but	  not	  mathematicans,	  even	  if	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  the	  technical	  work	  of	  either	  of	  them.	  Perhaps	  it’s	  	  because	  Chomskian	  linguistics	  is	  so	  different	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  linguistics,	  and	  so	  technical.	  Or	  because	  it	  is	  so	  counterintuitive	  that	  there	  may	  be	  constraints	  on	  our	  language	  and	  thought	  of	  which	  we	  are	  not	  aware.	  Or	  perhaps	  it’s	  just	  ambitions	  of	  self-­‐aggrandizement	  through	  giant-­‐killing.	  	  So	  far,	  Chomsky	  himself	  has	  easily	  and	  rigorously	  answered	  all	  challenges.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  he	  has	  been	  and	  remains	  the	  giant	  in	  the	  field	  he	  created.	  And	  now	  that	  his	  remaining	  years	  are	  increasingly	  devoted	  to	  the	  other	  project	  in	  which	  he	  also	  looms	  larger	  than	  any	  mortal	  on	  the	  planet	  –	  saving	  the	  world	  –	  there	  may	  be	  no	  one	  left	  to	  stave	  off	  the	  lilliputians	  bent	  on	  levelling	  the	  unique	  and	  towering	  structure	  that	  he	  has	  sculpted	  (or	  unearthed).	  	  	  
